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A SCHOOL UNDER FIRE: 
THE FOG OF EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE  
IN WAR
Kathe Jervis
This article explores a little-known footnote in the history of the U.S. military 
occupation in Iraq. In mid-2007, when the war in Iraq was at its height, the author 
accepted a job to document the beginnings of a school designed and operated by 
the U.S. military in Iraq. Although this school was in many ways like any other, 
every aspect ultimately was conditioned by its singular context: it was a school 
for Iraqi juveniles captured in war. The author documented the situation of the 
teenage detainees attending this school run by the U.S. military, and described 
their educational program. Data collection included both semi-structured and 
informal conversations with the detainees, their teachers, their guards, and those 
in the military hierarchy who made decisions about the school and its curriculum; 
the author also conducted extended classroom observations. Document analysis 
included school schedules, students’ written work and artwork, and assessments. 
The author gathered information to inform decision-makers about elements missing 
from the school program, to raise questions about texts and materials, and to offer 
ideas as the school developed. This article, which is adapted from the field notes the 
author maintained as part of her assignment, raises questions about the role of the 
U.S. military in providing education to detained Iraqi juveniles and describes daily 
life in school.
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INTRODUCTION
Although the optimistically named Dar al-Hikmah (House of Wisdom) was in 
many ways a school like any other, every aspect ultimately was conditioned by 
its singular context: it was a school for Iraqi juveniles captured in war. In mid-
2007, when the war in Iraq was at its bloody height, I accepted a job to document 
the beginnings of this school designed and operated by the U.S. military. Before 
leaving, I set down on paper what role I could play. My initial thoughts became 
my contract: 
I will be going to Camp Victory from August 19 to September 
24 to document the situation of the approximately 900 teenage 
Iraqi detainees in their new school, started by the U.S. Military.1 
I will describe their educational program and leisure time 
activities. Data collection will include talking to the detainees, 
their teachers, their guards, other soldiers with whom they 
come into contact, and those in the military hierarchy who 
make decisions about curriculum. Some of this talk will be 
based on protocols and some on opportunities that present 
themselves. As part of this documentation process, I will be 
available as a sounding board and also to reflect back what I 
see, should this be helpful for decision-makers as the school 
develops. In addition, I will notice what provisions are missing 
and raise questions about texts, materials, and ideas. My notes 
will derive from first-hand observations of daily life in school. 
I will collect documents that include school schedules, written 
work, artwork, and assessments. I will have the luxury of an 
undistracted eye to do this work and not have responsibility for 
program implementation or teaching. Given the improvised 
nature of the task, anything more I might do when I actually 
see the situation is a bonus. The goal in relationships is to do 
no harm.
That I was experienced in studying school startups, had written about crossing 
cultural boundaries, and could leave immediately compelled me to answer a call 
for unspecified help on this unprecedented project to educate young detainees 
held by the U.S. military in Iraq. It was not lost on me that I fit the profile of other 
Americans called on to interfere in Iraq: I did not speak Arabic or study juvenile 
detention, military culture, war zones, Middle East geography, or Iraqi education. 
1 Camp Victory, the largest U.S. military base in Iraq, is located outside Baghdad.
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And yet, the following narrative—a mere footnote to a disastrous war—tells a 
story that to my knowledge has not been told elsewhere. Besides recounting a 
U.S. military effort that should not be forgotten, the story I am about to tell calls 
attention to the blinders, both mine and others’, that the collective “we” wear 
when we do not understand enough about another culture. Despite the best 
intentions, our vision blurs. 
School startups under even the best conditions are notoriously complicated and 
improvisational. Planning leaves too little time to reflect on the contradictions of 
daily practice, whether in a war zone or urban charter school. This school in Iraq 
exemplifies how the ideas behind any new school can lose their power as they 
cycle through the bureaucratic layers and into the classroom. 
Besides the usual caveats about my own White Western monolingual urban 
identity and the philosophical tenets that make any description only partial 
and idiosyncratic, I was admittedly outside my comfort level. I arrived in Iraq 
in mid-August 2007, straight from a comfortable life in New York City, to sleep 
with seven other women in a “dry” shipping container. Dry meant there was no 
running water and the bathrooms were 200 yards away—though if I wanted to, 
I could walk to Saddam’s former palace and use his old, shoddily constructed 
shower with the gold-handled fixtures. 
The military rules and ranks were more foreign to me than the Arabic-language 
classrooms where I spent my days. I was the oldest person at Camp Victory, an 
outlier in this high-testosterone community of 30,000 young people, mostly men 
between the ages of 19 and 32, led by senior officers in their fifties. As a 65-year-
old grandmother, I sometimes hitchhiked the mile or so from the team office to 
the mess hall in afternoon heat that reached 130 degrees (like a sauna and not 
entirely unpleasant if you think of it that way). Those who gave me a lift often 
greeted me by saying, “I usually don’t stop for hitchhikers, but you remind me of 
my mother.” During an incoming mortar attack (harmless it turned out), a young 
officer from the South solicitously suggested, “Ma’am, why don’t you go into 
the next room where you’ll find a chair to sit in.” Senior citizen goes to war was 
perhaps a subtext, but the context was the work—24/7. Documenting the school 
kept me centered, but even so, I got just a glimpse of what detainment must have 
been like for these Iraqi teenagers. 
Before I set foot in the school I needed to gain minimal trust—for a start, 
unrestricted access to classrooms and permission to take notes with a laptop in full 
view. I also needed guidance about informed consent and parental permissions, 
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the standards of academic research ethics with juveniles, but the Marine colonel 
I reported to rebuffed me: “There are no ethics in detention centers. Get on with 
it.” Since I could not contact parents for permissions—detainees hardly knew if 
their parents were alive—parental permission was not possible. I accepted that 
some people, for instance journalists, report without conforming to institutional 
review board (IRB) processes and that military regulations do support some key 
IRB guidelines: I was forbidden to record the ID numbers detainees wore on their 
wrists, so I never identified any individual detainee, even in my notes, and no 
detainee was required to talk to me against his will. Although I had been against 
the war from its inception, I had chosen to work on this project, and so I got on 
with it.2
THE SCHOOL AND HOW IT CAME TO BE
“I am impressed,” I wrote on my first school day. “Opening any kind of school on 
this schedule requires Herculean effort. Are there medals for this?” The facility 
would be familiar in any impoverished, warm-weather U.S. school district with 
repurposed structures: four new soccer fields; a library with abundant natural 
light, whitewashed walls, and empty shelves; a small teachers’ room and similarly 
sized medic’s office; and classrooms with stacking plastic chairs, long plastic tables, 
TVs, small whiteboards, equipment for mopping the floors, and not much else. 
Anyone who taught in mobile units on a school playground or during the heyday 
of open education, where there were no full walls between adjacent rooms, would 
recognize these classrooms. The quality of the construction implied “temporary,” 
but the entire facility impressively signaled “school.” 
But this was not any school. I heard from a member of the Army Corps of 
Engineers who worked for 13 straight days to “harden” (fortify) this abandoned 
military training site that, like many “instant” schools, this one was set in a 
compromised space. The school was “inside the wire” but closer to local civilian 
territory than other structures on the base, which made it vulnerable to incoming 
mortars fired by insurgents. That Iraqis frequently fired on the base but never at 
the school suggests that they chose not to attack their young fellow countrymen. 
Engineers built multi-ton blast walls and waist-high cement bunkers everywhere 
on the base, but the school had extra barriers. No one could enter or leave the 
2 An exploration of the crucially important subject of research ethics in war is beyond the scope of this 
narrative, but excellent guidance can be found in Goodhand (2000).
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school without the guards moving a large Humvee to allow a vehicle to pass.3 
The military had positioned gates at intervals to prevent potential escapees from 
having direct routes to exits. Guard towers overlooked the soccer fields. A nine-
man, highly trained SWAT team equipped with non-lethal rubber bullets—
reputed to be close to lethal if fired at close range—stood ready to react to trouble. 
I never did get used to the “Deadly Weapons Authorized” sign, although soldiers 
on duty at the school checked their weapons into a designated arms room to 
prevent detainees from grabbing a gun. With all this military protection, it was 
easy to forget that these young detainees could be dangerous, but the general in 
charge of detainee ops urged me to take care, reminding me that two juveniles 
had recently killed a third.
Security routines ruled, a hybrid of military and prison logistics. I could see 
immediately that academic rigor would be hard to instill in these students, what 
with no homework or insistence on mastering academics. Their incentive for 
learning was to get a good report to the release board, based more on behavior 
than education. But security routines guaranteed less than optimal schooling. 
Guards woke the detainees at 5 am, breakfast was from 6 to 7 am, then the 
youth were loaded into 11 (new and expensive) buses for the 20-minute ride to 
Dar al-Hikmah. Twenty-five guards unloaded the buses one at a time, and each 
detainee was searched for contraband that he might use to make weapons. At 9 
am, four hours after wakeup call, classes finally began. At 4 pm, the procedure 
was reversed. Guards inspected every pocket for scraps of paper, bottle caps, or 
pencil fragments, then returned the detainees to their tents at 5 pm. It seemed to 
me a slow-motion grind for both guards and detainees. 
The same could be said of latrine breaks. The military had scrounged Iraqi-style 
latrines (for squatting), but not enough. (Outside contractors installed them 
without a cleaning contract, an odd detail that was either shoddy or consciously 
left to military ingenuity.) Bathroom routines often challenge schools, but the 
military required detainees, who were never trusted to be alone, to be escorted 
by trained escort teams. Three times a day, alongside their classmates, the young 
men waited in a squat for 25 minutes, hands behind their heads (called “stalled 
movement,” necessary for security), while taking turns on the WC and washing at 
the sinks, and then squatting again until the escorts returned them to class. 
3 I use “guard” to describe all the U.S. military personnel whose job was to regulate the daily life of the 
Iraqi juvenile detainees. These enlisted men deployed from various Army national guard units to conduct force 
protection, which included care and custody of detainees at Dar Al-Hikmah. When I was there, guards came 
from infantry units in New Mexico and California, military police from Rhode Island and Michigan, and field 
artillery from Utah.
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School had begun inauspiciously the week before I arrived. On the first day, the 
military had divided the approximately 700 detainees into classes of 60 students 
each, but 60 adolescent bodies did not fit into these small classrooms. Soldiers 
immediately sent all the detainees back to their tents, and the next day only 250 
detainees arrived, split into eight classes of 23-30. Now each detainee would 
attend school only one day out of three, instead of six days a week. That change 
weakened the entire point of the school—to provide a consistent, intensive 
educational experience for all detainees—and the gap between intention and 
execution was widened in one fell swoop. Visitors, military inspectors, and the 
press, however, would hardly notice. 
Running a school for juveniles detained in war was unprecedented in the history 
of U.S. military combat operations. Marine reservist Major General Stone, a 
charismatic and wealthy Silicon Valley software developer and the new head of 
Detainee Operations TF-134, lobbied General David Petraeus for a site, cajoled 
visiting Senator Lindsey Graham for funds, and fought resistance to his idea up 
and down the chain of command. Even without final approval, he ordered his 
U.S. military and Iraqi civilian staff to create a school on paper. This being the 
military, the school would need an “official” emblem. The clever overworked 
soldier tasked to design it found a private school logo on the Internet, overlaid 
the image on the red, white, and black Iraqi flag, added the name of the school in 
Arabic, and voila—the exquisite symbol of Dar al-Hikmah was born. 
The school was indeed an inspired vision, but “vision” was not exactly the right 
word for this nascent effort. No military doctrine existed for how to operate a 
school for juveniles, and neither Stone nor his staff had professional education 
experience. As Stone said at a press conference during the first week of school, 
“I’m not sure where we’re going to go with the youth, other than I’m very hopeful.” 
Moreover, the noble goal of educating young Iraqi detainees was not Stone’s most 
pressing priority. He also was responsible for the increasing number of Iraqi 
adults being swept off the streets during the U.S. surge, who were confined in an 
overcrowded detention facility at Bucca, a tinderbox always on the verge of a riot. 
My first day on the job, in a raucous bout of after-hours storytelling to initiate 
me into the team—non-alcoholic, due to base rules, but with the feel of everyone 
wishing for a drink—Stone told me emphatically, “This school is not Exeter, and 
this is war.” 
Because the Geneva Conventions require that juveniles captured during a conflict 
be held no more than a year, Stone charged his staff with creating a time-limited 
experience powerful enough to convince adolescent detainees not to join—or 
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rejoin—the insurgency. In the absence of a crafted school mission statement, I 
collected a list of intentions gathered directly from Stone and his staff: 
• Practical: Keep these teenage detainees occupied, give them skills, and 
keep them away from identified extremists.
• Possible: Open their minds to respect another way of thinking. That is 
the best we can do . . . we are not running a prep school, only a detention 
center.
• Values laden: Turn their world upside down and change the detainees’ 
perspective so they see themselves as part of the future of the new Iraq, 
rather than of the insurgency. 
• Optics (how the undertaking looks to others): Convince the wider world 
that Americans care about the education of Arab adolescents as much as 
(or more than) Arabs themselves do. 
• Aspirational: Hope that the future prime minister and other ministers 
in Iraq come from this detainee population.
To their credit, the military leadership thought hard about whether the school 
was to represent an American or an Iraqi enterprise, and whether to infuse the 
school environment with civilian or military culture. The military could have 
hired Americans or depended on uniformed teachers from their ranks, but 
they did not. Two decisions, reached early on, specified (1) only Iraqis or Iraqi-
Americans could teach; (2) no one in uniform was permitted in a teaching role. 
These two key values shaped the school as the only consistent practices unrelated 
to keeping order, and thus attempted to de-emphasize the military circumstances 
of detention during war and demonstrate faith in the future of a new Iraq led by 
Iraqis. 
Other embryonic ideas were slow to cohere, and answers to the perennial 
questions of what to teach and how to teach it were murky at best. The Strategic 
Communications Plan signed by Major General Stone ordered that “our 
engagement must be culturally appropriate: Iraqi values, not Western, must have 
primacy.” But the primacy of Iraqi values necessarily conflicted with exposure 
to Western values that the military hoped the Iraq of the future would adopt. 
As part of my role was to find opportunities for “changing juvenile mindsets,” 
I was dismayed to find that the school planners—a mix of American military 
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personnel, Iraqi American civilian teachers, and one local Iraqi teacher—never 
proposed teaching anything other than the Iraqi curriculum. Could a rote Iraqi 
curriculum persuade these young men to believe in a unified Iraq and moderate 
Islam? Perhaps they already embraced such ideas, but no one had asked them, 
nor would most Americans on site have trusted their answers. The school, like 
the occupation, faced the tension between respecting Iraqi values and making 
Iraqis into democratic citizens. 
Other than English instruction, the classroom structure was the same whether 
it was a lecture on methods of water purification or basic Iraqi geography: 
students raised their hands to answer the teachers’ questions. I hoped to write 
down discussions, note students’ questions, and record debate—all hallmarks of 
the best American curriculum—but these teachers followed the traditional Iraqi 
template of lecture and recitation, with the teacher as absolute authority. It may 
have been colossally naive to begin with so many contradictory goals, but every 
school startup faces similar inconsistencies; time is too limited to think through 
how all but the most central values will translate into practice. Even as I began to 
observe, it nagged at me how this American school could educate detainees to 
Iraqi norms and yet change those norms to reflect U.S. military goals. 
My favorite sergeant, who ran the school day-to-day, had no school administrative 
experience but did have a calm demeanor and excellent judgment. He carried 
around a tattered e-mail printout confirming that the Iraqi education minister 
would provide a newly revised post-Saddam curriculum, but by the third week 
of school he was gnashing his teeth and lamenting that the final agreement still 
languished, unsigned, on the minister’s desk—perhaps a not-so-subtle signal 
of ministerial disapproval. He showed me another document meant to be a 
“brainstorming device and vague curriculum outline” that got sent up the chain 
of command and came back as a binding agreement. The planners had written in 
this 10-page “Juvenile Education Report” that the school’s goal was “to provide the 
detainees with basic educational skills to the Iraqi fifth-grade level while opening 
their minds to the democratic process and the concepts therein, while creating a 
more compliant population.” It would be hard to beat that mixed message. 
The school plan offered the detainees a chance to learn, but it also aimed to 
expose them to idealized American values of tolerance and diversity. Created to 
educate Iraqis, Dar al-Hikmah was still “school” as American soldiers imagined 
it. Classes would take place six days a week, but not Friday, the Muslim day of 
rest; subject-matter teachers would move from classroom to classroom; the 
schedule would include lunch, prayer, soccer, Arabic, math, geography, civics, 
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and English. Contrary to usual Iraqi practice, the planners decided to track 
detainees into academic levels. They used familiar American methods to chart 
progress, including anecdotal behavior sheets, tests scores, report cards, and 
health information. Enlisted men set up folders to hold students’ classwork—not 
for every detainee but enough to demonstrate their intention to keep records. 
Most problematic in this original school plan was class size. Sixty students to 
one teacher was not unheard of in Iraq’s best schools, but these inexperienced 
administrators clearly had not visualized that number of adolescents in the new 
school’s classrooms. 
ADOLESCENTS IN DETENTION AT CAMP CROPPER
Flash to the 30 minutes’ drive from the dusty center of Camp Victory to the even 
dustier school grounds on another part of the base. After traveling across the 
world to finally see the school for myself, I was turned back for not having the 
correct badge. (Was it a careless bureaucratic error, or had I not yet earned that 
elusive minimal trust?) I was taken instead to Camp Cropper on another edge of 
Camp Victory to see where the juveniles were quartered. Cropper is the rumored 
site of Saddam Hussein’s execution and where the Americans were detaining 
several thousand adults, including “high-value detainees” from Saddam’s inner 
circle. In this hot, unrelievedly brown environment ringed with coiled razor wire, 
and after many more checkpoints that required finessing my lack of a proper 
badge, I finally set eyes on the young detainees I had been fantasizing about. 
My Iraqi American driver concealed her ID card so no one could punish her 
prominent Baghdad family for having a relative working for the American 
military. The ubiquitous multi-ton concrete barriers faded from my consciousness 
as the teenagers milling about outside their tents came into focus—most of 
them 16 and 17 but some as young as 11. Groomed and ready for prayers—the 
Qur’an dictates having a clean body and clean clothes when praying—some were 
wearing spotless white dishdashas (ankle-length shirts) rather than their usual 
yellow jumpsuits. They were a startlingly attractive group of teenagers. Some 
looked as familiar to me as the olive-skinned, brown-eyed Semitic teenagers I 
grew up with. A bilingual-bicultural advisor (BBA) attached to the military took 
me to meet a poised detainee who was serving as compound chief. He greeted 
us politely in a mix of English and Arabic as if we were guests in his home, even 
though we were talking across a wire mesh fence. This handsome 16-year-old 
chatted pleasantly about daily life with manners any American parent would 
brag about, until he became agitated and begged the BBA to arrange a new exam 
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schedule at his old school so as not to delay his university entrance. He railed 
against his unfair detention that was derailing his life. “Of course I will do it,” 
the BBA agreed, although she had no intention—or standing—to intervene. 
“He needs to believe in his future . . . to have hope,” she said. Encouraging 
hope (even false hope) was an all-hands effort emanating from Major General 
Stone. Hopelessness was thought to be dangerous in a post–Abu Ghraib world. 
As Northwestern law professor Joseph Margulies (representing detainees at 
Guantanamo and Camp Cropper) said on October 24, 2007, “Guantanamo was 
built as a place to extinguish hope . . . the hope of going home, the hope of being 
reunited with family, the hope of family coming to you. Hope keeps prisoners 
alive. And if you extinguish hope, a prisoner will curl up and die.”
As I recorded the day’s experience in my notes, I wondered, who were these 
charming teenagers? Extremists? Thwarted university students? I got to 
know them over the month I worked in Iraq because they talked to me as an 
interesting diversion or because they thought it might speed their release, 
although I told them repeatedly it would not. However, I could not fully tap 
into their complex thinking, especially since the availability and skill of Arabic 
translators was scandalously low, and I had few opportunities to clarify what I 
thought I understood. When a detainee had mastered enough English, I found 
our conversations more thoughtful, which bends this account toward English-
speaking detainees. Detainees could refuse to talk to me, and some did. Refusal—
whether a coping strategy to avoid churning up feelings, to conserve energy, or 
to show their peers they were not cooperating with any American woman—was 
final and in their control. However, without any inducements, most detainees 
willingly shared details about their own and their family’s education, work, 
leisure time, religion, and career aims.
I also heard stories from the guards. At Camp Cropper I watched the soldiers 
outside the wire mesh who kept the confined detainees always in sight, wondering 
how they could stand the boredom. The detainees essentially governed themselves 
within highly supervised physical boundaries and American-devised student-
council-like organizational structures. They served their own locally provisioned 
food, did their own laundry, shaved and cut each other’s hair in special enclosures 
with guard-issued implements that were counted after every use, listened to 
Arabic music on guard-controlled radios that produced mostly static, and played 
soccer in bare feet. Some prayed. Some read the Qur’an. Depending on individual 
temperaments, life in detention could be either unbearably monotonous or 
reassuringly routine, for both detainees and their guards.
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Although U.S. military representatives intended their treatment of these juveniles 
to nourish hope, the youths’ lives were a mix of hope and hopelessness. In one 
version of hope, detention was a novel adventure for those who had never left 
home and had had limited educational opportunities. This view included formal 
schooling, good food, and the parents’ relief that their sons were out of harm’s 
way during a raging civil war. These young men also got the best medical care in 
Iraq at the state-of-the-art hospital that served soldiers and detainees as equals. 
This picture was hopeful, sometimes even fun—when a group of detainees moved 
into new tents, the surveillance camera caught them exuberantly doing backflips 
off the stacked sleeping mats. One described his compound mates: “We are all 
brothers.” I thought it was psychologically healthy that the detainees reported 
helping and being helped by others. Those who were in this hopeful mode told 
me of visits from their families, recounting them down to smallest detail (the 
“taxi cost 50,000 dinars”). The detainees told their parents about the good food 
and new school—just the sort of messages the military hoped would reach 
families and tribes. Some argued, as did Steve Carleton Ford and colleagues, that 
“Baghdad teenagers showed heightened sense of self in the face of war” (Carlton-
Ford et. al 2008). Being detained with others strengthened their pride, as they 
stood in solidarity with their tent mates. I wanted to be convinced that perhaps 
this sense of belonging, confidence, and optimism would help them learn. 
But such impressions of detention could shift in an instant. Although detainees 
concealed or repressed their considerable anger toward the Americans in 
conversations with me, they described tears, depression, fear, sadness, and 
loneliness. I met bereft 11- to 17-year-olds who missed their families more than 
they could bear. They worried about family members who might be dead, injured, 
or displaced from their homes. A 12-year-old tried to control his tears: “I don’t 
know if my father is alive, and I haven’t heard from my mother.” One detainee 
said he had no visitors because his mother was sick and “my father and two 
brothers are in Bucca.” He pleaded to be transferred to Bucca to be with them. 
An increased burden of guilt for getting caught fell on oldest sons who were 
responsible for supplementing the family income. An only child of a divorced 
mother (both rare in the stories I heard) told me, “My mother is alone. I don’t 
know how she gets money now, but when she visits, she tells me not to worry. 
My mom is sad, very lonely without me.” Some detainees were bewildered by 
detention. “I never thought I would be in this situation,” lamented one young man 
who said his family didn’t know where he was. Another admitted, “I don’t want 
my family to know that I was captured. I’m ashamed.” And even when detainees 
wanted to tell their families where they were, the officer in charge acknowledged 
that reaching a wrong phone number on the first try could end the effort. A 
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16-year-old detainee with sad eyes told me, “Before bed, I think about my family, 
especially my mother. Sometimes I cry. Most of the time I sit by myself.” Many 
detainees reported “keeping to myself,” which seemed unlikely, given the social 
interactions I observed. Perhaps they wanted their captors to think they were 
minding their own business and not suspect them of conspiring with others. 
Detainees’ stories of their capture sounded rehearsed: “I was in my bed under the 
blanket when the soldiers came and took me away.” Only the bedtimes differed. 
In the one story that rang true, the teller had a sparkle in his eye as he told me, 
“You won’t hear from me that I was under the blanket at home. I was at the 
supermarket and a solider kicked my car, and I hit him back. He arrested me.” 
The American soldiers told me more believable stories of how detainees came 
to be captured: a young man in the wrong place at the wrong time; a committed 
insurgent attempting to defend his country by killing U.S. soldiers; a hapless 
adolescent caught in the sectarian snare of meddling neighbors who reported him 
for some vendetta; a youngster with criminal tendencies and poor judgment; or a 
desperate 16-year-old earning money for his poverty-stricken family by helping 
insurgents. Even if detainees’ capture stories did not always ring true, I found 
their description of the lives they lived before being captured to be credible.
Alas, uncertainty prevailed—a powerlessness that could bury hope. Many 
detainees wondered, Why was I captured? What was I charged with? How long 
before my release? The U.S. military promoted transparency by instituting six-
month case reviews, but despite good intentions, these reviews were reputed to 
be cursory. Detainees often did not know the contents of their capture records 
or—as is usual in war—have legal help to make their case. While the press and 
various humanitarian groups saw these reviews as being better than nothing, 
the detainees believed fervently that they mattered greatly. Most adjusted their 
behavior to present a favorable record.
But not all. At Cropper I saw a young man locked up in a security housing unit—
in other words, solitary confinement in a six-foot-square wire cage. His offense 
seemed to be nothing more than a typical middle school dust-up. Or maybe it 
lost something when translated as “arm-wrestling.” The sanguine BBA noted that 
the detainee had water and that a guard was standing nearby to ensure his safety. 
The young man’s imminent release after 24 hours in the cage may have accounted 
for his cheerful demeanor, but it was hard to believe “he didn’t seem to mind 
at all.” That image of a 15-year-old caged in the hot sun still haunts me. Hope 
seemed a puny abstraction. 
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And yet the school was a source of hope. Education confers dignity and recognizes 
the worth of those privileged to receive it. In Iraq, as almost everywhere in the 
world, formal education can unlock access to a better future. These detainees 
had hopeful, credible career aims: to become doctors, teachers, pharmacists, 
translators, bodyguards for government leaders, and officers in the Iraqi army. 
Even those who had no previous schooling and wanted to return to village life to 
care for their land and livestock hungered for education. Despite the American 
military’s ambitious plans to promote literacy, books were scarce, except for the 
Qur’an. Only the chief and an English speaker in each compound, chosen by the 
military for their leadership qualities and English facility, had access to pencil, 
paper, and an Arab-English dictionary. The military had permitted library books 
until pages ended up as “chai rocks”—pieces of paper carrying illicit messages, 
dipped in sweet tea mixed with dirt, hardened in the sun, and hurled over the 
walls or into other compounds. Discordant goals on the ground (encouraging 
literacy but forbidding books) foreshadowed the intractable dilemma of creating 
a coherent educational experience.
TEACHING DEMOCRACY IN A COERCED ENVIRONMENT
The classroom was the stated arena for “turning the detainees’ world upside 
down” and introducing them to democratic concepts. But what classroom 
experience could be powerful enough to convince a teenager who was invested in 
a civil war to abandon it? Without any experience of democracy (making choices, 
seeing that one’s actions matter, free elections), the democratic process could only 
be an abstract principle to a captive adolescent, even if he valued these ideas. 
Some guards believed that raising their hands to decide which DVD to watch 
gave detainees practice in making choices. But this mild exercise could hardly 
teach tolerance for other sects engaged in the bloody war or model how to settle 
sectarian disputes at the ballot box. For these juveniles, choosing DVDs was as 
close it came to demonstrating democracy.
Every good education involves transformation, so it is fair to ask whether the 
detainees could have been dramatically changed by any program, especially 
one created by an enemy. Diversified methods and novel curriculum that could 
have exposed detainees to another way of thinking were nowhere visible on any 
teachers’ agenda. Teachers at Dar al-Hikmah were in fact contractually bound 
to keep their opinions to themselves. They could not discuss politics or reveal 
themselves as Shia or Sunni, and they had to promote the idea of “One Iraq.” The 
civics teacher allowed that the Dar al-Hikmah rules were stricter than in his old 
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school; he said he missed teaching “outside the wire,” where he could reveal his 
thinking to his students and solicit theirs. 
I learned how inappropriate political talk was when I got caught up in asking the 
faculty to introduce Guernica, Picasso’s famously anti-war 1937 painting of the 
Spanish Civil War.4 I brought hard-to-procure color copies of the painting to a 
faculty meeting and, with admirable good nature and Arab charm, each teacher 
spoke against using it. One teacher correctly pointed out that the “detainees don’t 
know about the Spanish Civil War, and they don’t care.” (But they did know war!) 
Another added, “Why raise anything dangerous and prone to cause trouble?” 
Another agreed: “We don’t want any topic that brings up the questions: ‘Why am 
I here? Why can’t I be released?’ That is all the detainees care about or express in 
class.” Even the linguist on duty, a young U.S. soldier educated in Iraq until she 
was 16, became so agitated that she stepped out of her translator’s role—with a 
(necessary) apology—to agree with the teachers. She interjected that in Iraq she 
had never been asked to discuss subjects that did not have a “right” answer and 
questioned how teachers could even begin to teach such things. That teachers 
might ask detainees to draw something in response to seeing Guernica prompted 
one teacher to argue, “Why would you even want them to draw non-Iraqi art 
anyway?” While teachers did not embrace—and in fact emphatically rejected—
self-expression in their own classrooms, they willingly discussed these ideas 
with easy laughs and open-ended possibilities (“What about a piece of sculpture 
about Iraq?”). But open-ended discussion was not “school” in this U.S. military 
setting. As for what detainees should be taught, one teacher spoke for all: Iraqi 
curriculum. Why would you want to change it? When I raised the issue of how 
to meet the school’s stated goal of opening minds to the democratic process, one 
teacher responded, “All we can teach for now is One Iraq. Love your country. 
Strive for peace.” I soon became skeptical that any curriculum taught in an 
authoritarian manner could promote compromise and encourage the multiple 
perspectives needed to overcome a divided Iraq. 
Teaching for democracy and One Iraq fell to the charismatic local Iraqi civics 
teacher. He was in his thirties, and he risked his life every time he traveled from 
his home to Camp Victory. Since most Iraqi schools were closed and even low-
paid work was scarce, he was pleased to be at Dar al-Hikmah but nervous that, if 
curfews prevented him from returning to work after his day off, he could lose this 
highly valued job. When I visited his class one afternoon during Ramadan, he 
seemed relaxed and engaged, although he lectured sitting down, facing the first 
4 Other than this attempted intervention, I didn’t influence what happened at school; I made 
recommendations after I left.
December 2016 129
A SCHOOL UNDER FIRE: THE FOG OF EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE IN WAR
row of students across a narrow table rather than standing, as he usually did. The 
27 detainees answered questions when asked and took notes on yellow legal pads 
using plastic safety pens, which were collected after class. The detainees obeyed 
on cue, perhaps because all papers, which were filed under their ID numbers, 
went to the board that reviewed records for their release, or perhaps because the 
authority of the teacher was absolute. This teacher did not have enough English, 
nor I any Arabic, to discuss his six-page handwritten notes, so I was beholden 
to the linguist assigned to me. This linguist listened for several minutes and 
told me the topic written on the board was, “What unites people of one country 
together?” The list on the board generated by detainees from the lecture included 
“language, culture,” and some words the linguist said he did not know. Thus the 
linguist translated the civics teacher’s 30-minute lecture all too succinctly as “the 
teacher is talking about democracy . . . and more democracy.”
The teacher’s notes, titled “The Democratic System in Iraq”—translated and 
summarized later by an American graduate student—included ideas for 
understanding democracy as we in America know it: upholding human rights, 
the need for a more educated Iraqi society, the importance of music and art to 
the public education curriculum, government by the majority party, fairness in 
exercising power, equal treatment before the law, and free elections. The lecture 
had even cited John Dewey. Democracy—this incomplete, ambitious aspiration 
even in our most democratic of societies—may have puzzled the students as 
they experienced entirely undemocratic American detainment. But even if the 
detainees had wanted to explore the relevance this lecture had to their lives—
how they would fit into the post-Saddam One Iraq or what the future held for 
them and their ummah (community/nation)—those discussions would have 
been out of sync with both teachers’ obligation to avoid politics and detainees’ 
understanding of school. Left not only unspoken in any planning meeting but 
unnoticed by all (including me at the time) was the irony of teaching American-
style democracy in a coerced environment. Such is the fog of educational practice 
in war. 
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LITERACY AND ILLITERACY
People in societies with strong oral traditions who memorize the Qur’an by rote 
develop legendary memories. I was amazed to see these Iraqi detainees—without 
pencils or paper or access to books—respond in detail to teachers’ lectures during 
lively class discussions. Thus I was baffled by how often people characterized 
the juvenile (and adult) detainees as illiterate or incapable of independent 
thinking, or by written comments like “most lack reasoning skills,” which was 
variously attributed to living under Saddam or to a relentlessly rote, primarily 
oral curriculum. This demeaning of detainees’ abilities seeped into conversations 
on the base and into press accounts. However, neither living under a dictator nor 
rote education wipes away the human ability to think. I saw too many classes in 
which 28 out of 30 detainees produced a page of written Arabic text to believe 
that “most” juvenile detainees were illiterate. 
The illiteracy myth began before the school opened: “If only these detainees could 
read, they would see the Qur’an forbids violence.” The military had organized 
literacy classes (at great expense) for the 60 percent of adult detainees who were 
believed to need reading instruction. Most adults could read the Qur’an on their 
own—some adults were insulted by lessons in reading it—but it was too late to 
backtrack from a well-publicized campaign to eradicate illiteracy (and from the 
expensive contract behind it). By then, the image of detainees’ illiteracy—cited 
everywhere by military higher-ups and thus in visitors’ accounts in the press—
had reinforced resistance to seeing the young men as smart and capable learners, 
some with significant prior education and skills on which to build.
One response to the civics lecture on democracy exemplified for me the tendency 
to consider detainees less capable than they probably were. I asked an Arabic-
speaking consultant to the military to look at the civics teacher’s notes; he judged 
them “too advanced for the intended audience . . . more like a Foreign Affairs 
article than a high school lecture . . . The teacher should simplify the material.” 
This call to simplify reflected the typical response to the detainees, even when 
there was evidence of their skill. 
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To divide the youths into academic tracks, the sergeant in charge of day-to-
day administration collected rudimentary assessments, the results of which he 
carried in his pocket: 
• 39% Advanced (High School)
• 17% Intermediate (Middle School)
• 23% Primary
• 13% Basic (Illiterate)5
 
Neither the assessments nor the classes yielded enough clues to support the 
theory that most detainees were illiterate, but the stereotype persisted. The result 
of this illiteracy narrative was that the school had no budget for materials above 
the fifth-grade level.
Teachers targeted their lectures “to the middle,” much as they would have in 
Iraqi schools, where only students who passed exams stayed in school. Despite 
experiencing a possible academic mismatch, detainees enthusiastically praised 
the school. Only once, when a teacher was absent and I found myself alone with 
the class (and guards), did an angry detainee rail at me about this “baby school.” 
Otherwise, politeness (or perhaps fear of a bad record) ruled. An honest-seeming 
detainee told me, “I want to learn, but I don’t think my peers do. They sit with 
their hands folded and look at the teacher, but they don’t focus or listen. They 
have their own thoughts.” The detainees’ willingness to appear engaged—even if 
they were not—bespoke remarkable self-control.
BEYOND ACADEMICS
Like many adolescents, detainees had more to say about non-academics than 
about their classes. No wonder. The realities of the classroom did not always match 
the schedule. Frequently, six teachers were assigned to six classrooms, but eight 
classes of detainees came to school, leaving 60 detainees without teachers. Guards 
took charge of the 60 and played DVDs for them. The detainees didn’t complain; 
on the contrary, as one said, “TV and soccer are my favorite things in school.” 
Another said, “At school I like to play soccer and see videos. I like the tape with 
songs and belly dancers most.” The cover of that favorite tape was falsely labelled 
“Rebuilding Iraq.” Donated chess sets and dominoes languished on the shelves, 
mostly unused, but detainees had more than enough screen time. The planners 
5 This does not include the 8 percent who were classified as “extremists” and not allowed at school.
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wanted detainees to have some “entertainment,” but they never thought of using 
educational media to occupy teacher-less classes. Detainees gorged on Superman 
and Spiderman with Arabic subtitles, and cheered the Iraqi soccer team’s upset 
victory over Saudi Arabia. But they mostly begged for Tom and Jerry cartoons. 
On their love for Tom and Jerry, guards and detainees agreed, as one teenager 
explained: “Tom and Jerry is beautiful because it is funny. All Iraqi people think 
it is funny. I like the way the cat and mouse fight.” The interpreter interjected 
without being asked that he liked Tom and Jerry too. No one ever seemed bored, 
even by the same cartoons: “I want to see it so many times because I like it,” one 
detainee said. The guards and detainees could “relax and laugh together” over 
this universal humor. Perhaps the films and videos, even Tom and Jerry, could 
have been used to spark analysis and group discussion, but this never happened 
because it would have fallen outside the accepted pedagogy. And no one even 
thought of it, including me, as I sometimes zoned out during screen time, lost in 
the fog of war or undone by the afternoon heat. 
The teacher shortage meant that, the longer detainees went without teachers, the 
more downtime with DVDs they came to expect. And the more they watched 
DVDs, the more removed they became from disciplined learning and the harder 
teachers had to work to restore good study habits. With a stable and sufficient 
staff, the school could have encouraged detainees to work much harder than 
they did. As it was, the obvious improvisation in starting this school had to raise 
speculation that the Americans were not capable of organizing a proper school—
or did not really care to.
But school is never just about academics. The way any school demonstrates 
kindness carries both comfort and symbolism. The food, the living conditions, 
and the respectful treatment shown by adults can be as powerful as—maybe 
even more powerful than—classroom instruction. And in this school, food 
was done right. When I could I ate lunch in classrooms, rather than with the 
soldiers, which the detainees liked, since it validated that the Americans were 
treating them well. Detainees ate tasty, fresh local food, unlike the soldiers’ bland 
fatty fare sent from Florida at great expense. Under guard, detainees picked up 
lunch in large Styrofoam containers and served it themselves in their classrooms 
on paper plates. Utensils were mostly forbidden; we scooped thick bean and 
vegetable stews (mostly okra) with pita bread. The menu included fresh fruit, 
sweet chai, and refreshing bottles of ice-cold water (elsewhere on base we drank 
bottled water, hot from the sun). A teacher marveled that, unlike his “miserable 
Iraqi childhood” with no water at school, these detainees got cold water whenever 
they asked. He gestured to the bottles in huge ice containers, which were available 
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to both generals and detainees: “We all drink the same.” Surely the message of 
equality, worth, and simple humanity was not lost on the detainees and likely 
came across more powerfully than lectures about democracy. As I observed daily 
life at the school, I came to believe that exposing detainees to the best American 
treatment that the military could support was more likely to convince the 
detainees of American good-will than any specific curriculum.
TEACHING UNDER GUARD
Teacher morale was remarkably high, despite the war-zone conditions. Although 
teachers taught for money and the chance to work, many expressed a passionate 
mission to “build the new Iraq”—at least in public. Congenial colleagues 
chatted in animated Arabic on shared rides to quarters, at lunch, and on breaks, 
when they often brought pastry for each other. Local Iraqi teachers took life-
threatening risks by cooperating with the U.S. military and—in a bizarre policy—
were forbidden to move around Camp Victory without an escort. They had worse 
living conditions (cots rather than beds) and much lower salaries than the well-
paid émigré Iraqi Americans doing the same teaching, and their meager pay 
was often late or incomplete. In order not to be recognized by detainees who 
might disclose their work with Americans, local Iraqi teachers taught with fake 
names, wore hats and sunglasses, and sometimes changed their facial hair. The 
satisfactions these skilled teachers got from teaching were hard to see. They rarely 
saw the same students; the rosters shifted as detainees were released and others 
rolled up; they did not know the names of their students, nor did detainees know 
the teachers’ (fake) names. Arabic-only speakers were sometimes assigned to 
teach English. Yet the teachers persisted in good spirits; their ethos was to soldier 
on.
Perhaps the guards helped. “It is a pleasure not to think about classroom control,” 
said an Iraqi American teacher, not missing a job in the U.S. Three guards sat in 
each classroom (each carrying pepper spray and a radio), always next to the most 
efficient air conditioners. They left only when they rotated for meals (20 minutes 
each) or to bring back a dry cereal snack. Guards kept detainees in their seats until 
the teacher arrived, reminded slouching students to sit up, supervised cleanup, 
monitored non-routine requests to use the WC, handed out water, controlled the 
TV, dealt with medical emergencies, and sometimes even made photocopies, thus 
eliminating non-teaching duties that often drain American teachers. 
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U.S. soldiers with a knack for language and a willingness to learn some Arabic 
were rewarded by respectful attention from the detainees. The students gathered 
around a sergeant—a truck driver in civilian life—who carried a Qur’an and had 
taught himself some Arabic. He was pleased that “kids want to talk to me every 
day about what I am reading in the Qur’an.” Detainees also surrounded an Army 
linguist who had escaped from war-torn Sudan. These teenagers wanted to hear—
in Arabic—about life outside Iraq. But most guards distanced themselves from the 
detainees. The language barrier was tough, and the U.S.–Iraqi cultural boundaries 
were overlaid with compliance and authority issues that may have interfered with 
their ability to feel empathy. Some soldiers felt for “these poor kids who were 
in the wrong place at the wrong time,” while others seethed because they knew 
someone who had been killed by the Iraqi forces. The angry guards were more 
likely to complain about resources given to “educate the enemy” or to argue that 
an “uneducated enemy is easier to fight.” My first day on the job, an officer told 
me that “guards are not convinced these detainees are redeemable individuals.” 
Although doctrine discouraged engaging the guards in the classroom, I imagined 
that a curriculum for the guards about how to interact with the detainees in a 
teaching role would improve the soldiers’ military life, if not help detainees. But 
perhaps it asks too much of human capacity to ask guards to educate their enemy.
Guards sometimes behaved like rowdy teenagers. I heard unassigned guards 
in an empty classroom guffawing so loudly as they watched a movie that they 
interfered with teaching in the room next door. Or paper airplanes sent over the 
classroom wall would suddenly land on detainees, courtesy of the guards taking 
a break next door. A BBA recounted how, when he asked soldiers outside his 
classroom to be quiet, one guard gave him the finger and cursed him. He told 
me, “I make $180,000 a year. I know my culture. How can I do my job with the 
detainees when the guards disrespect me? I am going to General Stone about 
the zoo that he is trying to present as a school.” These guards may have reflected 
tensions at Cropper, where they faced confrontational behavior from detainees 
who threw bottles of urine and feces at them—but it was only the guards who 
erupted at school.  
Perhaps the guards were not hostile but merely bored. Warriors often recount 
the incredible boredom they experience between battles, but no soldier about to 
deploy could have envisioned spending so many mind-numbing hours in Arabic-
language classrooms guarding compliant 11- to 17-year-olds. The mostly young 
guard force, a mix of about 70 combat-trained infantry, military police, and field 
artillery units, did not appreciate their safe assignment. One soldier spoke for 
others: “I’d rather be out kicking down doors in Baghdad. Every soldier needs a 
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bit of danger every day.” Not that soldiers talked about their boredom; in their 
world, the way to wage war was to stay in your lane, put one foot in front of the 
other, and get the job done. But their body language told the story—their tedious 
expressions, glazed-over eyes, or the kind of nervous energy I associate with high 
schools where students are tuned out and just waiting for the bell to ring.  
RELIGION
I looked for Sunni-Shia tensions, expecting that relations outside the wire would 
be mirrored inside. But sectarian tensions were not salient at school, although 
perhaps the self-control the detainees exhibited in class kept sectarian differences 
out of sight. The military reasoned that, although underlying tensions might erupt 
if they denied Sunni-Shia friction, if they treated the sects as warring groups they 
would be accepting or even promoting the cleavage. Thus they took no chances 
at Cropper: they separated the Sunni and Shia tents, Shias and Sunnis prayed 
in different spaces at school (oddly labeled “Study Hall” on the schedule), but 
otherwise students spent the school day together. 
In keeping with the goal of One Iraq, the school planning officer aimed to merge 
Sunni and Shia tents at the “right” time, and as a first step he ordered all detainees 
to ride the buses and take classes together. Guards were skeptical: “Sunnis and 
Shias never talk to each other.” “They won’t play on the same soccer team.” “They 
sit together in class by sect.” “I am surprised that Shias and Sunnis can ride the 
buses together without fighting.” The 90 percent Sunni majority in detention—
due primarily to the Sunni insurgency in majority Shia Iraq—surprised many 
Shias, which made the guards’ perspectives credible. As it happened, it was 
only accidental that I (or the guards) could even tell Sunnis and Shias apart. All 
the jumpsuits were marked with a large “J,” but the detainee marking the Shia 
uniforms wrote G for “juvenile” and then crossed it out with an X, making it 
possible to tell Shia from Sunni. I interpreted their separateness more benignly 
than the guards did. The two Shia tents at Cropper housed 25 to 35 detainees 
each, and thus accorded more opportunities for community than was possible 
for the Sunnis in their two large compounds with 350 detainees each. Buses were 
loaded and unloaded by tent by tent, so it seemed natural that Shias sat together 
when filing into class. On the soccer field, when no one was playing due to the 
hot the afternoon sun, I assumed that detainees hung out in the scarce shade with 
those they knew best.  
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Sectarian war seemed far away and adults connected to the school reinforced 
that narrative. No one there—civilian or military, Iraqi or American—publicly 
imagined a future other than One Iraq. Many detainees begged to be released 
into the united Iraq they believed (perhaps disingenuously) had already been 
secured by the U.S. Both detainees and Iraqi American adults often talked of 
how it “used to be,” when sectarian quarrels did not come between neighbors 
and Sunni fathers and Shia mothers could live peacefully in one family. Everyone 
who had experienced it yearned for this earlier era. A Shia detainee, in lively, 
sophisticated English—learned, he said, during his seven months in detention—
recounted an all-too-typical story of a family fractured by war: 
My father was an officer in Saddam’s army. He was killed in 
the Iraq–Iran war. My mother is a doctor—a Shia, by the way. 
Everyone in my family is more educated than I am. I left school 
after nine years. My sister is a teacher. My mother has visited 
me three times. She doesn’t want to leave Iraq, but my brothers 
and sisters have fled. Our family will only be together in Iraq 
when the Shias and Sunnis stop killing each other. 
Even as the military worried about sectarianism, they took religious observance 
seriously, assuming every detainee needed a prayer rug and a Qur’an. Soon they 
found otherwise. Juveniles confirmed their own lack of observance, although 
they acknowledged praying more in detention “because I have more time” or “it 
is something to do.” As Ramadan approached, most Sunnis planned to fast, even 
if they hadn’t in Saddam’s secular Iraq. One detainee exemplified the rest: “On the 
outside, some days I fasted and some days I drank Pepsi with my family . . . One 
day, yes; other day, maybe, maybe not. Here it is no big deal to fast.” The military 
planned for a smooth Ramadan at Cropper, arranging for appropriate meals after 
sundown and before sunup. A BBA taught a 15-minute “cultural awareness” class 
at 3:15 (am and pm) to impress on the 24-hour guard force not to drink, eat, or 
smoke near the detainees. The Iraqi youth minister brought (delicious) dates to 
the detainees, a traditional food to break the fast. 
But at school, cultural blinders—or at least a lack of understanding—caused 
military administrators to either overlook or ignore local knowledge when 
creating a Ramadan schedule. Iraqi teachers would have embraced the usual 
mornings at school and time to rest in the afternoon, but the newly arrived officer 
charged with making the schedule imagined hungry, wide-awake detainees at 
loose ends hours before sundown. He chose to hold afternoon classes to reduce 
the time between school and sunset. Teachers often see such an ill-advised 
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decision coming, but they rarely have the power to contest it. So, from the first day 
of Ramadan, the schedule proved a mistake. School started at noon. A reporter 
from the London Times was visiting. Fasting teachers looked gray and washed 
out, perhaps their bodies’ response to the first day of fasting. After a nap in an icy 
air-conditioned space they returned to class refreshed and chatting jovially, but 
a late afternoon English class exuded lethargy, and most detainees slept on their 
prayer rugs. The teacher complained, “There will be no benefit from school for a 
month,” emphatically gesturing to the sleeping class. “I can teach comfortably in 
the morning, but not in the afternoon.”
But however it was scheduled, Ramadan was a welcome event for some detainees. 
A Ramadan picnic remains a pleasant memory of the sense of community I saw 
among the Shias; my notes reflect this meal as the most relaxed I ever saw any 
detainees:
The Sunnis mostly fasted, so the military cancelled lunch, 
though anyone could request food. I gravitated to Shia prayers, 
surprised to find a picnic in progress, with 14 of 16 enjoying 
their Halal MREs (Meals Ready to Eat, the military rations 
for battle). While a guard removed the heating element in 
each MRE foil packet, forbidden to the detainees as a possible 
weapon, the detainees lounged on prayer rugs chatting amiably 
in groups of three or four. The two fasters happily talked to me. 
As the rest indulged in junk-food heaven (pretzels, peanuts, 
sunflower seeds), they looked like any good friends enjoying a 
break from the usual school routine.
SCHOOL IN THE PUBLIC EYE
Publicity—always a priority for Major General Stone—pulled in just as many 
directions as the other school goals. Although using scarce resources to educate 
possible terrorists highlighted American generosity toward Iraqi youth, it also 
generated unpopularity. The Arab press could construe the American effort to 
educate captives as brainwashing—and it did. 
To mark the school opening, Major General Stone held a briefing. Tariq al-
Hashemi, the vice president of Iraq, signaled his support by attending. The 
military gave out a document in not quite grammatical English that read, 
“Education can spark a fire inside Iraq’s youth to continue their education and 
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rebuild Iraq for their future . . . The mission is to . . . give a vision of hope for the 
future by pursuing truth . . . The overall [school] program is meant to enlighten 
minds that have been darkened by extremists.”
Two weeks later, Major General Stone invited the world to see this fledgling 
school. For nine of the next 14 days, diverse opinion-shapers arrived in droves: 
the Western and Arab print press, Anderson Cooper, Martha Raddatz, U.S. 
congressional delegations, Iraqi politicians, the inspector general of the Army, 
the International Red Cross, and high-ranking officers from the Multi-National 
Force–Iraq. Even Iraqi soccer stars came “to boost detainee morale.” Calculated 
to impress, these visits demonstrated U.S. efforts to educate their enemy and 
showcase the school as a symbol of America’s hope for Iraq. That the war on the 
ground was bloody and the adult detainees at Bucca barely under control made 
this new school an especially encouraging, almost heartwarming “must see” for 
any official visitor to the war zone.
These visits, however, cost dearly. No new school can withstand such scrutiny 
without dedicating substantial resources to visitors, especially if the school is 
simultaneously educating students. This school lacked sufficient personnel, 
but the military staff knew more about welcoming higher-ups than fine-tuning 
curriculum, so it was no contest what got their attention. Day-to-day school 
military administrators—already few by usual school standards—prepared 
meticulously for these high-stakes occasions, working out routes through the 
school and talking points timed to the minute. Visits highlighted care and custody 
more than teaching and learning. The Inspector General of the Army and his 
entourage were taken to only one class, and the five minutes they stayed to watch 
students studying the Arabic alphabet could not help but reinforce a widely held 
image of “illiterate detainees.” Details had to be exact: staff went to great lengths 
to replace the old Iraqi flag featuring Saddam’s handwriting, lest some newspaper 
print a picture of this obsolete symbol hanging on the library wall. After almost 
every VIP visit, a new rule came from any high-ranking leader who happened to 
accompany a delegation—for instance, no soccer on VIP days because detainees 
playing with bare feet would track mud into the classrooms. 
One final vignette illustrates a particularly dramatic day of cultural 
misunderstanding. Tariq al-Hashemi’s deputies arrived to join Major General 
Stone, ABC, and the New York Times. Everyone was watching the detainees play 
soccer (wearing new soccer shoes donated by the Iraqi minister of youth and 
sports), when suddenly Iraqi visitors began handing envelopes to any detainee 
who happened to be on the field or in the library. Americans assumed it was some 
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kind of certificate, but each envelope in fact held a U.S. $100 bill. The Iraqis giving 
out money randomly was hard to square with an (often unmet) ideal of American 
fairness. The stunned U.S. military bystanders thought even Major General Stone 
was blindsided. That night a small riot in the adult detainee compound seemed 
connected to this unequally offered cash gift. Iraqi adults, however, saw only 
good intentions; traditionally, Iraqis bring gifts when they visit people they don’t 
know, and if those people are poor, they bring money. International law required 
the guards to log this money as personal property, and that is how soldiers spent 
the rest of their disrupted day. Detainees could claim it on release or give it to 
their families on visitation day, which was exactly what the Iraqis who gave the 
cash meant to happen. 
What the military meant to happen to the school after the worldwide attention 
it received was less clear than I had understood at the outset of my stay. I should 
have paid more attention to Major General Stone’s admonition that he was not 
aiming to create a prep school but a tool of war. I was mindful of a sign, posted 
deep inside one of the military offices, that read, “A vision without resources is 
hallucination.” The military pushed forward with the school, ignoring obstacles 
that prevented a fully realized enterprise: limited resources (not enough money 
to pay more teachers), distracting priorities (VIP visitors who drained energy 
needed to develop a stronger school), and competing pressures (learning pitted 
against security requirements). The war zone added its own challenges: arcane 
military regulations, anxious detainees, and the stress of deployment on guards. 
But more resources, better planning, a clearer vision, and even more latrines 
might not have accomplished the idealistic goal of preparing these adolescents to 
contribute to a new social order after at most one year of intermittent schooling. 
The detainees’ self-control at school was striking. These young men were too 
guarded, in both senses of the word: too much under guard and too circumspect 
to open themselves up to being transformed in this American detention center 
or to allow their world to be “turned upside down.” Most deeply held values 
are not changed easily, and attempting to reshape these detainees in a coerced 
environment—if they indeed even needed to be convinced about One Iraq—was 
perhaps a fool’s errand. But it was still a marker of hope that there was a school 
at all.
How to honor Iraqi values and yet transform the detainees to be more like “us” 
turned out to be a central dilemma of the entire occupation. A more competently 
run school with a rigorous Iraqi curriculum at all academic levels would have 
been a miraculous gift to these detained Iraqi youth—an olive branch rather 
Journal on Education in Emergencies140
JERVIS
than a tool of war. But that would have required additional resources and Iraqi 
educational expertise beyond the capacity of the U.S. detainee operations. Such a 
school may have been even less likely to help change the detainees’ world views, 
if indeed any school curriculum anywhere can be said to transform students. The 
creation of this school was couched in the language of cultural awareness: “The 
importance of local context in evaluating and understanding . . . cannot be over-
emphasized. We must be vigilant against our own bias.” But, in reality, Dar al-
Hikmah was mandated to serve the American war effort. 
And yet . . . Despite its haphazard curriculum, the unexamined values at the 
classroom level, and large doses of Tom and Jerry, I believe the effort to create Dar 
al-Hikmah was positive. Anecdotes filtered up that parents wanted their children 
to stay in detention for their own safety—perhaps one measure of success. The 
military everywhere cited another, more difficult measure: only 12 juveniles 
who attended the school were recaptured by the U.S. military. No one attempted 
to find out why. Was it because the school transformed the majority who were 
not recaptured—as the military would like to believe—or was it because those 
detainees were not terrorists in the first place, were smart enough to evade 
recapture, or were dead? In June 2009, when the U.S. Status of Forces in Iraq 
restricted the mandate to detain, the military gradually phased out the school. 
I came to believe that the successes and failures of the school had more to do with 
how detainees were treated than with any specific classroom practice. I saw that 
it was more effective to adopt the rote Iraqi curriculum and to shift hearts and 
minds—if indeed they needed shifting—by treating detainees humanely rather 
than by pushing any particular course of study. The food, the living conditions, 
and the detainees’ treatment by the guards (even though they were sometimes 
bored, hostile, or acting out) appeared as powerful as anything that happened 
during the school day. A school may be “serious” not because of the rigor of the 
curriculum or the homework or the exams, but because the adults underscore 
the seriousness of the meaning of “school.” That would have required creating a 
different curriculum, not only for the detainees but for the military.
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